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Abstract. Learning to detect fraud in large-scale accounting data is one
of the long-standing challenges in financial statement audits or fraud in-
vestigations. Nowadays, the majority of applied techniques refer to hand-
crafted rules derived from known fraud scenarios. While fairly successful,
these rules exhibit the drawback that they often fail to generalize beyond
known fraud scenarios and fraudsters gradually find ways to circumvent
them. To overcome this disadvantage and inspired by the recent success
of deep learning we propose the application of deep autoencoder neural
networks to detect anomalous journal entries. We demonstrate that the
trained network’s reconstruction error obtainable for a journal entry and
regularized by the entry’s individual attribute probabilities can be in-
terpreted as a highly adaptive anomaly assessment. Experiments on two
real-world datasets of journal entries, show the effectiveness of the ap-
proach resulting in high f1-scores of 32.93 (dataset A) and 16.95 (dataset
B) and less false positive alerts compared to state of the art baseline
methods. Initial feedback received by chartered accountants and fraud
examiners underpinned the quality of the approach in capturing highly
relevant accounting anomalies.
Keywords: Accounting Information Systems · Computer Assisted Au-
dit Techniques (CAATs) · Journal Entry Testing · Forensic Accounting
· Fraud Detection · Forensic Data Analytics · Deep Learning
1 Motivation
The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners estimates in its Global Fraud
Study 2016 [1] that the typical organization lost 5% of its annual revenues due
to fraud. The term ”fraud” refers to ”the abuse of one’s occupation for personal
enrichment through the deliberate misuse of an organization’s resources or as-
sets” [47]. A similar study, conducted by PwC, revealed that nearly a quarter
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Debit Credit Debit Credit
 Company  Entry ID  Fiscal Year  Type  Date  Time
 AAA  100011  2017  SA  31.10.2016  
 AAA  100012  2017  MZ  31.10.2016
 BBB  900124  2017  IN  01.02.2017
 ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...
 Company  Entry ID  Sub-ID  Currency  Amount  D/C
 AAA  100011  0001  USD  1’000.00  D
 AAA  100011  0002  USD  1’000.00  C
 BBB  900124  0001  USD  2’232.00  D
 ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...
Accounting Information System (AIS)
Fig. 1. Hierarchical view of an Accounting Information System (AIS) that records
distinct layer of abstractions, namely (1) the business process, (2) the accounting and
(3) technical journal entry information in designated database tables.
(22%) of respondents experienced losses between $100’000 and $1 million due to
fraud [39]. The study also showed that financial statement fraud caused by far
the highest median loss of the surveyed fraud schemes3.
At the same time, organizations accelerate the digitization and reconfigu-
ration of business processes [32] affecting in particular Accounting Information
Systems (AIS) or more generally Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems.
Steadily, these systems collect vast quantities of electronic evidence at an almost
”atomic” level. This holds in particular for the journal entries of an organi-
zation recorded in its general ledger and sub-ledger accounts. SAP, one of the
most prominent enterprise software providers, estimates that approx. 76% of the
world’s transaction revenue touches one of their ERP systems [41]. Figure 1 de-
picts a hierarchical view of an AIS recording process of journal entry information
in designated database tables.
To detect potentially fraudulent activities international audit standards re-
quire the direct assessment of journal entries [2],[22]. Nowadays, the majority of
applied techniques to examine journal entries refer to rules defined by experi-
enced chartered accountants or fraud examiners that are handcrafted and often
executed manually. The techniques, usually based on known fraud scenarios, are
often referred to as ”red-flag” tests (e.g. postings late at night, multiple vendor
bank account changes, backdated expense account adjustments) or statistical
analyses (e.g. Benford’s Law [9], time series evaluation). Unfortunately, they of-
ten don’t generalize beyond historical fraud cases already known and therefore
3 The ACFE study encompasses an analysis of 2’410 cases of occupational fraud in-
vestigated between January 2014 and October 2015 that occurred in 114 countries.
The PwC study encompasses over 6’000 correspondents that experienced economic
crime in the last 24 months.
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fail to detect novel schemes of fraud. In addition, such rules become rapidly
outdated while fraudsters adaptively find ways to circumvent them.
Recent advances in deep learning [31] enabled scientists to extract complex
nonlinear features from raw sensory data leading to breakthroughs across many
domains e.g. computer vision [29] and speech recognition [34]. Inspired by those
developments we propose the application of deep autoencoder neural networks
to detect anomalous journal entries in large volumes of accounting data. We
envision this automated and deep learning based examination of journal entries
as an important supplement to the accountants and forensic examiners toolbox
[38].
In order to conduct fraud, perpetrators need to deviate from regular system
usage or posting pattern. Such deviations are recorded by a very limited number
of ”anomalous” journal entries and their respective attribute values. Based on
this observation we propose a novel scoring methodology to detect anomalous
journal entries in large scale accounting data. The scoring considers (1) the
magnitude of a journal entry’s reconstruction error obtained by a trained deep
autoencoder network and (2) regularizes it by the entry’s individual attribute
probabilities. This anomaly assessment is highly adaptive to the often varying
attribute value probability distributions of journal entries. Furthermore, it allows
to flag entries as ”anomalous” if they exceed a predefined scoring threshold. We
evaluate the proposed method based on two anonymized real-world datasets of
journal entries extracted from large-scale SAP ERP systems. The effectiveness of
the proposed method is underpinned by a comparative evaluation against state
of the art anomaly detection algorithms.
In section 2 we provide an overview of the related work. Section 3 follows with
a description of the autoencoder network architecture and presents the proposed
methodology to detect accounting anomalies. The experimental setup and results
are outlined in section 4 and section 5. In section 6 the paper concludes with a
summary of the current work and future directions of research.
2 Related work
The task of detecting fraud and accounting anomalies has been studied both by
practitioners [47] and academia [3]. Several references describe different fraud
schemes and ways to detect unusual and ”creative” accounting practices [44]. The
literature survey presented hereafter focuses on (1) the detection of fraudulent
activities in Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) data and (2) the detection of
anomalies using autoencoder networks.
2.1 Fraud Detection in Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) Data
The forensic analysis of journal entries emerged with the advent of Enterprise
Resource Planning (ERP) systems and the increased volume of data recorded by
such systems. Bay et al. in [8] used Naive Bayes methods to identify suspicious
general ledger accounts, by evaluating attributes derived from journal entries
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measuring any unusual general ledger account activity. Their approach was en-
hanced by McGlohon et al. applying link analysis to identify (sub-) groups of
high-risk general ledger accounts [33].
Kahn et al. in [27] and [26] created transaction profiles of SAP ERP users.
The profiles are derived from journal entry based user activity pattern recorded
in two SAP R/3 ERP system in order to detect suspicious user behavior and
segregation of duties violations. Similarly, Islam et al. used SAP R/3 system
audit logs to detect known fraud scenarios and collusion fraud via a ”red-flag”
based matching of fraud scenarios [23].
Debreceny and Gray in [17] analyzed dollar amounts of journal entries ob-
tained from 29 US organizations. In their work, they searched for violations
of Benford’s Law [9], anomalous digit combinations as well as unusual tempo-
ral pattern such as end-of-year postings. More recently, Poh-Sun et al. in [43]
demonstrated the generalization of the approach by applying it to journal entries
obtained from 12 non-US organizations.
Jans et al. in [24] used latent class clustering to conduct an uni- and mul-
tivariate clustering of SAP ERP purchase order transactions. Transactions sig-
nificantly deviating from the cluster centroids are flagged as anomalous and are
proposed for a detailed review by auditors. The approach was enhanced in [25]
by a means of process mining to detect deviating process flows in an organization
procure to pay process.
Argyrou et al. in [6] evaluated self-organizing maps to identify ”suspicious”
journal entries of a shipping company. In their work, they calculated the Eu-
clidean distance of a journal entry and the code-vector of a self-organizing maps
best matching unit. In subsequent work, they estimated optimal sampling thresh-
olds of journal entry attributes derived from extreme value theory [7].
Concluding from the reviewed literature, the majority of references draw
either (1) on historical accounting and forensic knowledge about various ”red-
flags” and fraud schemes or (2) on traditional non-deep learning techniques. As
a result and in agreement with [46], we see a demand for unsupervised and novel
approaches capable to detect so far unknown scenarios of fraudulent journal
entries.
2.2 Anomaly Detection using Autoencoder Neural Networks
Nowadays, autoencoder networks have been widely used in image classification
[21], machine translation [30] and speech processing [45] for their unsupervised
data compression capabilities. To the best of our knowledge Hawkins et al. and
Williams et al. were the first who proposed autoencoder networks for anomaly
detection [20], [48].
Since then the ability of autoencoder networks to detect anomalous records
was demonstrated in different domains such as X-ray images of freight containers
[5], the KDD99, MNIST, CIFAR-10 as well as several other datasets obtained
from the UCI Machine Learning Repository4 [15], [4], [50]. In [51] Zhou and
4 https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets.html
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Fig. 2. Schematic view of an autoencoder network comprised of two non-linear map-
pings (fully connected feed forward neural networks) referred to as encoder fθ : Rdx 7→
Rdz and decoder gθ : Rdz 7→ Rdy .
Paffenroth enhanced the standard autoencoder architecture by an additional
filter layer and regularization penalty to detect anomalies.
More recently, autoencoder networks have been also applied in the domain of
forensic data analysis. Cozzolino and Verdoliva used the autoencoder reconstruc-
tion error to detect pixel manipulations of images [13]. In [16] the method was
enhanced by recurrent neural networks to detect forged video sequences. Lately,
Paula et al. in [35] used autoencoder networks in export controls to detect traces
of money laundry and fraud by analyzing volumes of exported goods.
To the best of our knowledge, this work presents the first deep learning
inspired approach to detect anomalous journal entries in real-world and large-
scale accounting data.
3 Detection of Accounting Anomalies
In this section we introduce the main elements of autoencoder neural networks.
We furthermore describe how the reconstruction error of such networks can be
used to detect anomalous journal entries in large-scale accounting data.
3.1 Deep Autoencoder Neural Networks
We consider the task of training an autoencoder neural network using a set of
N journal entries X = {x1, x2, ..., xn} where each journal entry xi consists of
a tuple of K attributes xi = (xi1, x
i
2, ..., x
i
j , ..., x
i
k). Thereby, x
i
j denotes the j
th
attribute of the ith journal entry. The individual attributes xj encompass a jour-
nal entry’s accounting specific details e.g. posting type, posting date, amount,
general-ledger. Furthermore, nij counts the occurrence of a particular attribute
value of attribute xj e.g. a specific document type or account.
An autoencoder or replicator neural network defines a special type of feed-
forward multilayer neural network that can be trained to reconstruct its input.
The difference between the original input and its reconstruction is referred to
as reconstruction error. Figure 2 illustrates a schematic view of an autoencoder
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neural network. In general, autoencoder networks are comprised of two nonlinear
mappings referred to as encoder fθ and decoder gθ network [40]. Most commonly
the encoder and the decoder are of symmetrical architecture consisting of several
layers of neurons each followed by a nonlinear function and shared parameters
θ. The encoder mapping fθ(·) maps an input vector xi to a compressed repre-
sentation zi in the latent space Z. This latent representation zi is then mapped
back by the decoder gθ(·) to a reconstructed vector xˆi of the original input
space. Formally, the non-linear encoder and decoder mapping of an autoencoder
encompassing several layers of neurons can be defined by:
f lθ(·) = σl(W l(f l−1θ (·)) + bl), and glθ(·) = σ′l(W ′l(gl−1θ (·)) + dl), (1)
where σ and σ′ denote non-linear activations e.g. the sigmoid function, θ de-
note the model parameters {W, b,W ′, d}, W ∈ Rdx×dz ,W ′ ∈ Rdz×dy are weight
matrices, b ∈ Rdz , d ∈ Rdy are offset bias vectors and l denotes the number of
hidden layers.
In an attempt to achieve xi ≈ xˆi the autoencoder is trained to learn a set of
optimal encoder-decoder model parameters θ∗ that minimize the dissimilarity of
a given journal entry xi and its reconstruction xˆi = gθ(fθ(x
i)) as faithfully as
possible. Thereby, the autoencoder training objective is to learn a model that
optimizes:
arg min
θ
‖X − gθ(fθ(X))‖, (2)
for all journal entries X. As part of the network training one typically minimizes
a loss function Lθ defined by the squared reconstruction loss or, as used in our
experiments, the cross-entropy loss given by:
Lθ(xi; xˆi) = 1
n
n∑
i=1
k∑
j=1
xij ln(xˆ
i
j) + (1− xij)ln(1− xˆij), (3)
for a set of n-journal entries xi, i = 1, ..., n and their respective reconstructions xˆi
over all journal entry attributes j = 1, ..., k. For binary encoded attribute values,
as used in this work, the Lθ(xi; xˆi) measures the deviation between two indepen-
dent multivariate Bernoulli distributions, with mean x and mean xˆ respectively
[10].
To prevent the autoencoder from learning the identity function the number
of neurons of the networks hidden layers are reduced indicating Rdx > Rdz
(usually referred to as ”bottleneck” architecture). Imposing such a constraint
onto the network’s hidden layer forces the autoencoder to learn an optimal set
of parameters θ∗ that result in a ”compressed” model of the most prevalent
journal entry attribute value distributions and their dependencies.
3.2 Classification of Accounting Anomalies
To detect anomalous journal entries we first have to define ”normality” with re-
spect to accounting data. We assume that the majority of journal entries recorded
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within an organizations’ ERP system relate to regular day-to-day business activ-
ities. In order to conduct fraud, perpetrators need to deviate from the ”normal”.
Such deviating behavior will be recorded by a very limited number of journal en-
tries and their respective attribute values. We refer to journal entries exhibiting
such deviating attribute values as accounting anomalies.
When conducting a detailed examination of real-world journal entries, recorded
in large-scaled ERP systems, two prevalent characteristics can be observed: First,
journal entry attributes exhibit a high variety of distinct attribute values and
second, journal entries exhibit strong dependencies between certain attribute
values e.g. a document type that is usually posted in combination with a certain
general ledger account. Derived from this observation and similarly to Breunig
et al. in [11] we distinguish two classes of anomalous journal entries, namely
global and local anomalies:
Global accounting anomalies, are journal entries that exhibit unusual
or rare individual attribute values. Such anomalies usually relate to skewed at-
tributes e.g. rarely used ledgers, or unusual posting times. Traditionally, ”red-
flag” tests performed by auditors during an annual audit, are designed to capture
this type of anomaly. However, such tests often result in a high volume of false
positive alerts due to events such as reverse postings, provisions and year-end
adjustments usually associated with a low fraud risk. Furthermore, when con-
sulting with auditors and forensic accountants, ”global” anomalies often refer to
”error” rather than ”fraud”.
Local accounting anomalies, are journal entries that exhibit an unusual
or rare combination of attribute values while their individual attribute values
occur quite frequently e.g. unusual accounting records, irregular combinations of
general ledger accounts, user accounts used by several accounting departments.
This type of anomaly is significantly more difficult to detect since perpetrators
intend to disguise their activities by imitating a regular activity pattern. As
a result, such anomalies usually pose a high fraud risk since they correspond
to processes and activities that might not be conducted in compliance with
organizational standards.
In regular audits, accountants and forensic examiners desire to detect journal
entries corresponding to both anomaly classes that are ”suspicious” enough for
a detailed examination. In this work, we interpret this concept as the detection
of (1) any unusual individual attribute value or (2) any unusual combination
of attribute values observed. This interpretation is also inspired by earlier work
of Das and Schneider [14] on the detection of anomalous records in categorical
datasets.
3.3 Scoring of Accounting Anomalies
Based on this interpretation we propose a novel anomaly score to detect global
and local anomalies in real-world accounting datasets. Our score accounts for
both of the observed characteristics, namely (1) any ”unusual” attribute value
occurrence (global anomaly) and (2) any ”unusual” attribute value co-occurrence
(local anomaly):
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Attribute value occurrence: To account for the observation of unusual or
rare attribute values we determine for each value xj its probability of occurrence
in the population of journal entries. This can be formally defined by
nij
N were
N counts the total number of journal entries. For example, the probability of
observing a specific general ledger or posting key in X. In addition, we obtain
the sum of individual attribute value log-probabilities P (xi) =
∑k
j=1 ln(1 +
nij
N )
for each journal entry xi over all its j attributes. Finally, we obtain a min-max
normalized attribute value probability score AP denoted by:
AP (xi) =
P (xi)− Pmin
Pmax − Pmin , (4)
for a given journal entry xi and its individual attributes xij , where Pmax and
Pmin denotes min- and max-values of the summed individual attribute value
log-probabilities given by P .
Attribute value co-occurrence: To account for the observation of irreg-
ular attribute value co-occurrences and to target local anomalies, we determine
a journal entry’s reconstruction error derived by training a deep autoencoder
neural network. For example, the probability of observing a certain general
ledger account in combination with a specific posting type within the popu-
lation of all journal entries X. Anomalous co-occurrences are hardly learned
by the network and can therefore not be effectively reconstructed from their
low-dimensional latent representation. Therefore, such journal entries will re-
sult in a high reconstruction error. Formally, we derive the trained autoencoder
network’s reconstruction error E as the squared- or L2-difference Eθ∗(x
i; xˆi) =
1
k
∑k
j=1 (x
i
j − xˆij)2 for a journal entry xi and its reconstruction xˆi under optimal
model parameters θ∗. Finally, we calculate the normalized reconstruction error
RE denoted by:
REθ∗(x
i; xˆi) =
Eθ∗(x
i; xˆi)− Eθ∗,min
Eθ∗,max − Eθ∗,min , (5)
where Emin and Emax denotes the min- and max-values of the obtained recon-
struction errors given by Eθ∗ .
Accounting anomaly scoring: Observing both characteristics for a single
journal entry, we can reasonably conclude (1) if an entry is anomalous and
(2) if it was created by a ”regular” business activity. It also implies that we
have seen enough evidence to support our judgment. To detect global and local
accounting anomalies in real-world audit scenarios we propose to score each
journal entry xi by its reconstruction error RE regularized by its normalized
attribute probabilities AP given by:
AS(xi; xˆi) = α×REθ∗(xi; xˆi) + (1− α)×AP (xi), (6)
for each individual journal entry xi and optimal model parameters θ∗. We intro-
duce α as a factor to balance both characteristics. In addition, we flag a journal
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AE Fully Connected Layers and Neurons
AE 1 [401; 576]-3-[401; 576]
AE 2 [401; 576]-4-3-4-[401; 576]
AE 3 [401; 576]-8-4-3-4-8-[401; 576]
AE 4 [401; 576]-16-8-4-3-4-8-16-[401; 576]
AE 5 [401; 576]-32-16-8-4-3-4-8-16-32-[401; 576]
AE 6 [401; 576]-64-32-16-8-4-3-4-8-16-32-64-[401; 576]
AE 7 [401; 576]-128-64-32-16-8-4-3-4-8-16-32-64-128-[401; 576]
AE 8 [401; 576]-256-128-64-32-16-8-4-3-4-8-16-32-64-128-256-[401; 576]
AE 9 [401; 576]-512-256-128-64-32-16-8-4-3-4-8-16-32-64-128-256-512-[401; 576]
Table 1. Evaluated architecture ranging from shallow architectures (AE 1) encompass-
ing a single fully connected hidden layer to deep architectures (AE 9) encompassing
several hidden layers.
entry as anomalous if its anomaly score AS exceeds a threshold parameter β, as
defined by:
AS(xi; xˆi) =
{
AS(xi; xˆi), AS(xi; xˆi) ≥ β
0, otherwise
, (7)
for each individual journal entry xi under optimal model parameters θ∗.
4 Experimental Setup and Network Training
In this section we describe the experimental setup and model training. We eval-
uated the anomaly detection performance of nine distinct autoencoder architec-
tures based on two real-world datasets of journal entries.
4.1 Datasets and Data Preparation
Both datasets have been extracted from SAP ERP instances, denoted SAP ERP
dataset A and dataset B in the following, encompassing the entire population of
journal entries of a single fiscal year. In compliance with strict data privacy reg-
ulations, all journal entry attributes have been anonymized using an irreversible
one-way hash function during the data extraction process. To ensure data com-
pleteness, the journal entry based general ledger balances were reconciled against
the standard SAP trial balance reports e.g. the SAP ”RFBILA00” report.
In general, SAP ERP systems record a variety of journal entry attributes
predominantly in two tables technically denoted by ”BKPF” and ”BSEG”. The
table ”BKPF” - ”Accounting Document Header” contains the meta informa-
tion of a journal entry e.g., document id, type, date, time, currency. The table
”BSEG” - ”Accounting Document Segment”, also referred to journal entry line-
items, contains the entry details e.g., posting key, general ledger account, debit
and credit information, amount. We extracted a subset of 6 (dataset A) and 10
(dataset B) most discriminative attributes of the ”BKPF” and ”BSEG” tables.
The majority of attributes recorded in ERP systems correspond to categorical
(discrete) variables, e.g. posting date, account, posting type, currency. In order
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Fig. 3. Training performance using dataset A of the evaluated autoencoder architec-
tures AE 1 - AE 9 (left). Training performance using dataset B of the individual journal
entry attributes (right).
to train autoencoder neural networks, we preprocessed the categorical journal
entry attributes to obtain a binary (”one-hot” encoded) representation of each
journal entry. This preprocessing resulted in a total of 401 encoded dimensions
for dataset A and 576 encoded dimensions for dataset B.
To allow for a detailed analysis and quantitative evaluation of the experi-
ments we injected a small fraction of synthetic global and local anomalies into
both datasets. Similar to real audit scenarios this resulted in highly unbalanced
class distribution of ”anomalous” vs. ”regular” day-to-day entries. The injected
global anomalies are comprised of attribute values not evident in the original
data while the local anomalies exhibit combinations of attribute value subsets
not occurring in the original data. The true labels (”ground truth”) are avail-
able for both datasets. Each journal entry is labeled as either synthetic global
anomaly, synthetic local anomaly or non-synthetic regular entry. The following
descriptive statistics summarize both datasets:
– Dataset A contains a total of 307’457 journal entry line items comprised of 6
categorical attributes. In total 95 (0.03%) synthetic anomalous journal
entries have been injected into dataset. These entries encompass 55
(0.016%) global anomalies and 40 (0.015%) local anomalies.
– Dataset B contains a total of 172’990 journal entry line items comprised of
10 categorical attributes. In total 100 (0.06%) synthetic anomalous journal
entries have been injected into the dataset. These entries encompass 50
(0.03%) global anomalies and 50 (0.03%) local anomalies.
4.2 Autoencoder Neural Network Training
In annual audits auditors aim to limit the number of journal entries subject to
substantive testing to not miss any error or fraud related entry. Derived from
this desire we formulated three objectives guiding our training procedure: (1)
minimize the overall autoencoder reconstruction error, (2) focus on models that
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10 training epochs 100 training epochs 400 training epochs
Fig. 4. Journal entry reconstruction error RE obtained for each of the 307.457 journal
entries xi contained in dataset A after 10 (left), 100 (middle) and 400 (right) training
epochs. The deep autoencoder (AE 8) learns to distinguish global anomalies (orange)
and local anomalies (red) from original journal entries (blue) with progressing training
epochs.
exhibit a recall of 100% of the synthetic journal entries, and (3) maximize the
autoencoder detection precision to reduce the number of false-positive alerts.
We trained nine distinct architectures ranging from shallow (AE 1) to deep
(AE 9) autoencoder networks. Table 1 shows an overview of the evaluated archi-
tectures 5 The depth of the evaluated architectures was increased by continuously
adding fully-connected hidden layers of size 2k neurons, where k = 2, 3, ..., 9. To
prevent saturation of the non-linearities we choose leaky rectified linear units
(LReLU) [49] and set their scaling factor to a = 0.4.
Each autoencoder architecture was trained by applying an equal learning
rate of η = 10−4 to all layers and using a mini-batch size of 128 journal en-
tries. Furthermore, we used adaptive moment estimation [28] and initialized the
weights of each network layer as proposed in [19]. The training was conducted
via standard back-propagation until convergence (max. 2’000 training epochs).
For each architecture, we run the experiments five times using distinct parameter
initialization seeds to guarantee a deterministic range of result.
Figure 3 (left) illustrates the performance of the distinct network topologies
evaluated for dataset A over progressing training epochs. Increasing the number
of hidden units results in faster error convergence and decreases the number of
detected anomalies. Figure 3 (right) shows the individual attribute training per-
formance of dataset B with progressing training. We noticed that the training
performance of individual attributes correlates with the number of distinct at-
tributes values e.g. the attribute bseg attrubute 10 exhibits a total of 19 distinct
values whereas bseg attribute 2 exhibits only 2 values and is therefore learned
faster.
5 The notation: [401; 576] − 3 − [401; 576], denotes a network architecture consisting
of three fully connected layers. An input-layer consisting of 401 or 576 neurons
(depending on the encoded dimensionality of the dataset respectively), a hidden
layer consisting of 3 neurons, as well as, an output layer consisting of 401 or 576
neurons.
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Fig. 5. Learned latent space neuron activations z1, z2 and z3 of autoencoder architec-
ture AE 9 and dataset A with progressing training epochs (left). Latent space repre-
sentation of dataset A learned by autoencoder architecture AE 9 after 2’000 training
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Once the training converged the trained models are used to obtain the recon-
struction errors RE of each journal entry. Figure 4 illustrates the reconstruction
errors obtained for the 307’457 journal entries contained in dataset A after 10
(left), 100 (middle) and 400 (right) training epochs. The used autoencoder (AE
8) learns to reconstruct the majority of original journal entries (blue) with pro-
gressing training epochs and fails to do so for the global anomalies (orange) and
local anomalies (red).
We set the anomaly threshold β = 0.01 implying that a journal entry is
labeled ”anomalous” if one of its attributes was not reconstructed correctly or
occurs very rarely. This was done in compliance with real-world audit scenarios
in which auditors tend to handle fraudulent journal entries in a conservative
manner to mitigate risks and not miss a potential true positive.
5 Experimental Results
This section describes the results of our evaluation. Upon successful training we
evaluated the proposed scoring according to two criteria: (1) Are the trained
autoencoder architectures capable of learning a model of the regular journal en-
tries and thereby detect the injected anomalies (”quantitative” evaluation)? (2)
Are the detected and non-injected anomalies ”suspicious” enough to be followed
up by accountants or forensic examiners (”qualitative” evaluation)?
5.1 Quantitative Evaluation
To quantitatively evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed approach, a range
of evaluation metrics including precision, standard f1-Score, top-k precision, ab-
solute and relative number of detected anomalies are reported. The choice of
f1-Score is to account for the highly unbalanced anomalous vs. non-anomalous
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Model Dataset Precision F1-Score Top-k
Anomalies Anomalies
[%] [#]
AE 1 A 0.0049 0.0098 0.0049 6.26 19’233
AE 2 A 0.0063 0.0126 0.0063 4.87 14’966
AE 3 A 0.0098 0.0194 0.6632 3.16 9’719
AE 4 A 0.0290 0.0564 0.7684 1.07 3’275
AE 5 A 0.0641 0.1204 0.6632 0.48 1’483
AE 6 A 0.0752 0.1398 0.5263 0.41 1’264
AE 7 A 0.0796 0.1474 0.7895 0.39 1’194
AE 8 A 0.1201 0.2144 0.5684 0.26 791
AE 9 A 0.1971 0.3293 0.6947 0.16 482
AE 1 B 0.0020 0.0040 0.0020 28.84 49’897
AE 2 B 0.0030 0.0059 0.0030 19.52 33’762
AE 3 B 0.0052 0.0104 0.6200 11.04 19’102
AE 4 B 0.0076 0.0150 0.7300 7.65 13’238
AE 5 B 0.0087 0.0173 0.7400 6.62 11’444
AE 6 B 0.0251 0.0489 0.6100 2.30 3’986
AE 7 B 0.0268 0.0522 0.6400 2.15 3’735
AE 8 B 0.0197 0.0387 0.6700 2.93 5’070
AE 9 B 0.0926 0.1695 0.4200 0.62 1’080
Table 2. Evaluation of anomaly detection performance for both datasets A and B
using autoencoder architectures AE 1 - AE 9. The training was constrained to mod-
els exhibiting a recall of 100% of the synthetic journal entries using standard back
propagation. Models were trained until reconstruction error convergence or max. 2’000
epochs. The best detection performances was obtained by architecture AE 9 consisting
of 17 hidden layers and LReLU activations.
class distribution of the datasets. To calculate the top-k precision we set k = 95
(dataset A) and k = 100 (dataset B) corresponding to the number of synthetic
anomalies in both benchmark datasets.
Table 2 shows the obtained results of both benchmark datasets using dis-
tinct network architectures. Increasing the number of hidden layers reduces the
number of detected anomalies. While preserving recall of 100%, the deepest
trained autoencoder architecture (AE 9) results in a low fraction of 0.16% de-
tected anomalies in dataset A and 0.62% detected anomalies in dataset B. The
observed results show that the autoencoder depth substantially affects its ability
to model the inherent manifold structure within each dataset. Figure 6 (left) il-
lustrates the anomaly score ASi distributions of the distinct journal entry classes
using a trained deep autoencoder (AE 9) and α = 0.3.
To understand the observed difference in detection performance for both
datasets we also investigated the learned latent space representations. Figure 5
(left) shows the mean neuron activation [z1, z2, z3] of the deep autoencoder (AE
9) three ”bottleneck” neurons z1, z2 and z3. With progressing training epochs
the network learns a distinctive activation pattern for each journal entry class.
Upon 2’000 training epochs a mean activation of [−12.99,−20.57,−50.55] can
be observed for textitglobal anomalies (orange), [−15.09, 18.99, 23.40] for local
anomalies (red) and [−1.67, 37.28, 44.76] for regular journal entries (blue). Figure
5 (right) shows the learned manifolds structure after the training completion.
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Method Data Precision F1-Score
ROC Anomalies Anomalies
AUC [%] [#]
PCA (c=30) A 0.0055 0.0110 0.9608 1.63 17’162
HDBSCAN (mcl=1’100) A 0.0256 0.0499 0.9787 1.29 3’714
LOF (k-NN=50) A 0.0499 0.0952 0.9979 0.62 1’901
OC-SVM (nu=0.005, γ=0.95) A 0.2769 0.4338 0.9999 0.11 343
AE (m=AE 9) A 0.5688 0.7251 0.9999 0.05 167
PCA (c=36) B 0.0331 0.0640 0.9978 1.75 3’025
HDBSCAN (mcl=7’445) B 0.0383 0.0720 0.9744 1.65 2’680
LOF (k-NN=10) B 0.0518 0.0986 0.9984 1.12 1’929
OC-SVM (nu=0.01, γ=0.95) B 0.1397 0.2451 0.9997 0.41 716
AE (m=AE 9) B 0.1616 0.2782 0.9997 0.35 619
Table 3. Comparative evaluation of the autoencoder based approach against sev-
eral unsupervised and non-parameteric anomaly detection techniques (best performing
parameters of each technique in brackets). For each method the best detection perfor-
mance is reported that results (1) in a recall of 100% of the synthetic anomalies and
(2) the best obtainable ROC-AUC.
5.2 Qualitative Evaluation
To qualitatively evaluate the character of the detected anomalies contained in
both datasets we reviewed all non-synthetic journal entries detected by the AE
9 architecture. To distinguish local from global anomalies we empirically choose
to set α = 0.3 and flagged the journal entries exhibiting an AS ≥ 0.4 as local
anomalies and AS < 0.4 as global anomalies.
As anticipated the review of the global anomalies revealed that the major-
ity of anomalies correspond to journal entries that exhibit one or two rare at-
tribute values e.g. journal entries that correspond to seldom vendors or seldom
currencies. In addition, we also detected journal entries referring to: (1) post-
ing errors due to wrongly used general ledger accounts; (2) journal entries of
unusual document types containing extremely infrequent tax codes; and (3) in-
complete journal entries exhibiting missing currency information. Especially, the
latter observations indicated a weak control environment around certain business
processes of the investigated organization.
The review of the local anomaly journal entry population showed that these
anomalies correspond to journal entries exhibiting attributes that are frequently
observable but rarely occur in combination e.g. changes of business process or
rarely applied accounting practices. A more detailed investigation of the detected
instances uncovered: (1) shipments to customers that are invoiced in different
than the usual currency; (2) products send to a regular client but were sur-
prisingly booked to another company code; (3) postings that exhibit an unusual
large time lag between document date and posting date; and, (4) irregular rental
payments that slightly deviate from ordinary payments. Our initial feedback re-
ceived by auditors underpinned not only their relevance from an audit but also
a forensic perspective.
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Fig. 6. Distribution of anomaly scores ASi of the distinct journal entry classes in
both datasets using a trained deep autoencoder (AE 9) and α = 0.3 (left). Fraction
of detected anomalies in both datasets for the evaluated autoencoder architectures
(right). Result variation originates from initializing the weights of each model with five
distinct seed values.
5.3 Baseline Evaluation:
We evaluated the autoencoder network based approach against unsupervised and
non-parametric anomaly detection techniques, namely (1) reconstruction error-
based: Principal Component Analysis (PCA) [36], (2) kernel-based: One Class
Support Vector Machine (OC-SVM) [42], (3) density based: Local-Outlier Factor
(LOF) [11], and (4) hierarchical nearest-neighbor based: Density-Based Spatial
Clustering of Applications with Noise (DBSCAN) [18] anomaly detection. For
all methods, besides DBSCAN, the performance was assessed using their imple-
mentations of the sci-kit machine learning library [37]. For DBSCAN we used
the optimized HDBSCAN implementation developed by Campello et al.[12].
To conduct a fair comparison an exhaustive grid search over each techniques
parameter space was conducted to determine their best performing parameters.
We report the anomaly detection performance of each technique in table 3. The
best performing results are selected based on parameterizations that (1) result
in a recall of 100% of the synthetic anomalies and correspond to (2) the highest
area under the ROC curve (ROC-AUC).
For both evaluation datasets, best ROC-AUC results are obtained for the OC-
SVM and the AE 9 autoencoder architecture. However, the autoencoder based
approach outperforms the other benchmark techniques in terms of its anomaly
detection precision. Comparing both the OC-SVM and the AE 9 for dataset A,
the autoencoder results in 176 less detected false positive anomalies; while for
dataset B, the autoencoder results in 97 less detected false positive anomalies.
The lower but highly accurate number of false positive alerts is of great relevance
in the context of real financial audit scenarios where substantiative evaluation
of a single detected anomaly can results in considerable effort.
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6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this work we presented the first deep learning based approach for the detec-
tion of anomalous journal entries in large scaled accounting data. Our empirical
evaluation using two real-world accounting datasets demonstrates that the re-
construction error of deep autoencoder networks can be used as a highly adaptive
anomaly assessment of journal entries. In our experiments we achieved a supe-
rior f1-score of 32.93 in dataset A and 16.95 in dataset B compared to state of
the art baseline methods. Qualitative feedback, received by auditors and forensic
accountants, on the detected anomalies underpinned that our method captures
journal entries of high relevance for a detailed follow-up audit.
We are excited about the future of deep learning based audit approaches and
plan to conduct a more detailed investigation of the journal entries’ latent space
representations learned by deep autoencoders. We believe that investigating the
latent manifolds will provide additional insights into the fundamental structures
of accounting data and underlying business processes. Furthermore, we aim to
evaluate the anomaly detection ability of more recently proposed autoencoder
architectures e.g. adversarial autoencoder neural networks.
Given the tremendous amount of journal entries recorded by organizations
annually, an automated and high precisions detection of accounting anomalies
can save auditors considerable time and decrease the risk of fraudulent financial
statements.
The code we used to train and evaluate our models is available at:
https://github.com/GitiHubi/deepAI.
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